A recent California appellate court decision found that a wage and hour exclusion in an Employment Practices Liability Insurance (“EPLI”) policy did not bar coverage for claims under California Labor Code sections 2800 and 2802 alleging failure to reimburse expenses. S. Cal. Pizza Co., LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London Subscribing to Policy No. 11EPL-20208, Case No. G056243, 2019 WL 4572859 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2019), as modified on denial of reh’g (Sept. 20, 2019). This is a significant decision. It gives policyholders an argument that insurers must defend wage and hour suits that include covered allegations of failure to reimburse expenses, as the court in Southern California Pizza found. Continue Reading Reimbursement of Employment-Related Expenses Is Not a “Wage and Hour” Claim Within the Meaning of EPLI Exclusion
In Pitzer College v. Indian Harbor Insurance Company, the California Supreme Court resolved two previously open questions in insurance law: (1) it concluded that the notice-prejudice rule is a fundamental public policy of California, and (2) it concluded that the notice-prejudice rule applies to consent provisions, but only in first-party policies.
This decision provides three primary lessons to insureds. First, when a first-party insurer cites a strict notice provision as a complete bar to coverage, a California policyholder should respond by citing the notice-prejudice rule, even if the policy selects the law of a state that does not follow the notice-prejudice rule. Second, the insured should do the same if a first-party insurer cites a consent provision as a basis to limit coverage for otherwise-covered expenses. In both cases, the notice-prejudice rule may override the choice of law provision and preserve coverage unless the insurer was actually and substantially prejudiced by the delayed notice/consent. Third, in the case of third-party policies, the insured should continue to promptly notify the insurer in the event of a claim and should seek consent before incurring otherwise-covered expenses. The insured should not rely on the notice-prejudice rule to potentially save coverage where it delays notice or fails to seek consent for expenses under a third-party policy. Continue Reading California Supreme Court Ruling Clarifies That the Notice-Prejudice Rule Is a Fundamental Public Policy That May Override Choice of Law Provisions
I recently moderated a Bar Association of San Francisco Insurance Section program co-sponsored with the Cannabis Law Section. The program highlighted recent changes to local insurance requirements and market availability of coverage for cannabis businesses.
Local insurance requirements vary greatly by city and county, and it is important to take this into account—especially if you will be doing business throughout California. While certain coverages are still unavailable (i.e., true outdoor crop insurance) or prohibitively expensive (i.e., quality D&O insurance), one point of optimism is that the insurance market is actually adapting quickly and well to the demand for insurance for this industry. As a result, the panel recommended reviewing and updating your insurance portfolio often with the assistance of a broker who is well versed in the cannabis space. Continue Reading Insurance for the Cannabis Industry Program Takeaways
Tyler Gerking was inducted as a Fellow of the American College of Coverage Counsel’s 7th Annual Meeting in Chicago, Illinois on May 9, 2019. Mary McCutcheon presided over the meeting as she completed her term as President of the College.
The American College of Coverage Counsel (ACCC), established in 2012, is the preeminent association of U.S. and Canadian lawyers who represent the interests of insurers and policyholders. The ACCC’s membership currently stands at over 300 Fellows. Its mission is to advance the creative, ethical and efficient resolution of insurance coverage and extracontractual disputes; to enhance the civility and quality of the practice of insurance law; to provide peer-reviewed scholarship; and to improve the relationships among the members of our profession.
Rounding out Farella’s participation in the College, Jennifer Bentley, a summer associate at Farella in 2018, received First Prize in the ACCC Law School Practical Skills Writing Competition.
Massachusetts Appeals Court Gets It Right – Mostly
Hot on the heels of the Federal Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in MTI, Inc. v. Employers Insurance Company of Wausau, __ F.3d __, 2019 WL 321423 (10th Cir. 2019) (about which I wrote earlier this month), the Appeals Court of Massachusetts also found that the phrase “that particular part” as used in exclusions j(5) and j(6) in the CGL policy must be applied narrowly. In All America Ins. Co. v. Lampasona Concrete Corp., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 79 (2019), the court held that damage caused to an underlying vapor barrier and a tile and carpet finish applied on top of the concrete floor slab poured by Lampasona was not excluded from coverage by the j(6) exclusion in the Lampasona’s policy. The court found that Lampasona did not install the vapor barrier or the tile/carpet, so they were not “that particular part” on which Lampasona was working.
Insurers often claim “economic damages” are not covered under a standard commercial general liability (CGL) policy. The Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Thee Sombrero, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 28 Cal. App. 5th 729, 736 (2018) review and request to depublish denied (Jan. 30, 2019), demonstrates that “loss of use” can be measured by “economic damages”—i.e., loss in profit or diminution in value—so long as they are tied to a property interest.
In Thee Sombrero, Inc., the insured’s negligent security services resulted in the revocation of Thee Sombrero’s permit to use its property as a night club after a patron was allowed to enter without passing through the metal detector, resulting in a fatal shooting. Thee Sombrero sued the security company, and obtained a default judgment. Thee Sombrero then pursued Scottsdale to satisfy the judgment. The trial court found in favor of Scottsdale, but the Court of Appeal reversed, finding that “the loss of the ability to use the property as a nightclub is, by definition, a ‘loss of use’ of ‘tangible property.’ It defies common sense to argue otherwise.” Id. Continue Reading Damages for Permit Revocation Constitute Covered “Loss of Use”
We do not often write about coverage opinions from jurisdictions as far away as Oklahoma; however, a recent case from the Federal Tenth Circuit looked at one of our favorite topics and came out with a much better reasoned opinion than recent decisions from the Ninth Circuit.
I’ve written before on the topic of the meaning of “that particular part” as the phrase is used in exclusions j(5) and j(6) of the Commercial General Liability (“CGL”) policy. The “j” exclusions exclude coverage for damage to certain property. Specifically, the j(5) and (6) exclusions state that the insurance does not apply to:
(5) That particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the “property damage” arises out of those operations; or
(6) That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it.
The part of these exclusions that some courts consistently get wrong is the meaning of the phrase “that particular part.” In particular, in June 2017 I wrote about the way the Ninth Circuit (supposedly applying California law) has on several occasions ignored the insurance industry’s own explanation of the meaning of the phrase “that particular part” and applied the exclusion to the entire project a contractor was working on. Continue Reading The 10th Circuit Correctly Construes “That Particular Part” Narrowly
On January 15, 2019, the Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the California Supreme Court:
Does a commercial liability policy that covers “personal injury,” defined as “injury… arising out of… [o]ral or written publication… of material that violates a person’s rights of privacy,” trigger the insurer’s duty to defend the insured against a claim that the insured violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by sending unsolicited text message advertisement that did not reveal any private information?
Yahoo! Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa., No. 17-16452, D.C. No. 5:17-cv-0447-NC.
Yahoo! sought coverage under its general liability policies issued by National Union for a number of putative class actions alleging that it violated the TCPA by transmitting unsolicited text message advertisements to putative class members. National Union denied coverage and Yahoo! sued for breach of contract. The Northern District granted National Union’s motion to dismiss and Yahoo! appealed that order to the Ninth Circuit.
In an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Central District of California’s interpretation of the related acts provision in a professional liability policy, holding that related acts reported in a prior policy period were not excluded from coverage in a subsequent period because that policy defined “Policy Period” to mean only the current policy period, not any policy period. Attorneys Insurance Mutual Risk Retention Group, Inc. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Co., No. 17-55597 (9th Cir., Feb. 15, 2019). As a result, the related acts clause, which incorporated this term, could not be read to aggregate claims first made under prior policy periods with those made in the current period. The case reinforces the importance of reviewing the particular language of an insurance policy rather than relying on case law interpreting similar language. Small differences in policy language can lead to significant changes in the available coverage. Continue Reading Claims-Made Policy Note: Policy’s Use of Defined Terms May Expand or Limit Coverage Under Related Acts Provision
In November, Tyler wrote about insurance issues raised by both the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy Act, which goes into effect on January 1, 2020. California’s governor Jerry Brown signed two other cyber-related laws in September, which will also go into effect on January 1, 2020 – Assembly Bill 1906 and Senate Bill 327, which address security concerns relating to devices that are capable of connecting to the internet – the so-called Internet of Things or “IoT”. See California Civil Code 1798.91.04(a) et seq.
The bills largely mirror each other and, put very simply, require manufacturers of devices that are capable of being connected to the internet to equip them with “reasonable” security features that are both appropriate to the device and require a user to generate a new means of authentication before access is granted to the device for the first time. Technologists are debating whether the laws are good or bad, and if good, whether they go far enough. Regardless, the law will become effective and manufacturers of IoT devices will have to comply with them. The law does not provide for a private right of action; it permits the state’s Attorney General to enforce its provisions.
The new California law applies to all connected devices sold or offered for sale in California. Because California is such a large market, this likely means that all such devices sold in North America and Europe will comply with California’s regulations, and older, less secure devices will be diverted to countries with fewer regulations.